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Abstract 
Android is an operating system based on the Linux kernel. It is the 
most widely used and popular operating system among Smartphones 
and  portable  devices.  Its  programmable  and  open  nature  attracts 
attackers  to  take  undue  advantage.  Android  platform  allows 
developers to freely access and modify source code. But at the same 
time it increases the security issue. A user is likely to download and 
install malicious applications written by software hackers. This paper 
focuses on understanding and analyzing the vulnerabilities present in 
android  platform.  In  this  paper  firstly  we  study  the  android 
architecture;  analyze  the  existing  threats  and  security  weaknesses. 
Then  we  identify  various  exploit  mitigation  techniques  to  mitigate 
known vulnerabilities. A detailed analysis will help us to identify the 
existing loopholes and it will give strategic direction to make android 
operating system more secure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Android is a fast growing and largest installed base of mobile 
platform which powers millions of mobile devices. Based on the 
Linux  kernel,  android  operating  system  is  open  and  flexible 
enough  to  run  on  different  mobile  devices  having  varied 
hardware  configuration  [6].  This  increases  the  popularity  and 
acceptance of android amongst the users.  
Android  platform  provides  developers  huge  opportunity  to 
develop applications to cater to the needs of its ever increasing 
user  base.  The  Android  platform  includes  applications, 
middleware  and  the  operating  system  [7].  Developers  use  the 
AndroidSDK,  which  consist  of  various  tools  and  APIs  to 
develop  applications  using  programming  language  like  Java. 
Android provides an open marketplace wherein developers can 
sell and distribute applications instantly.  
While  the  openness  of  android  provides  a  favorable 
atmosphere  for  users  as  well  as  developers,  it  also  attracts 
attackers  and  hackers  to  take  undue  advantage  [1].  The 
capability  of  android  to  run  on  different  devices  and  with 
different  versions exposes it  to varied security issues. Not all 
devices  can  be  updated  to  latest  version  because  of  the 
customization done by different device manufacturer. This result 
in  leaving  the  old  users  stay  unprotected  from  latest  security 
issues addressed in the new version [2].  
The  android  marketplace  lacks  rigorous  inspection  of  the 
applications  being  sold  and  distributed  by  developers  [1]. 
Applications can be published in the marketplace without any 
third  party’s  review.  It  leaves  a  device  running  android 
susceptible to stealing of data that is of corporate or personal 
use.  Smartphones  store  information  like  location  history, 
contacts, mails, call register, photos, messages or any other file 
that is important [2]. Malicious applications can gain access to 
user’s private information stored in the device. A malware can 
even try to gain root privileges and abuse the normal functioning 
of the device [3]. 
2. ANDROID PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE 
The Android platform was created by Android Inc. which was 
later bought by Google and called it the Android Open Source 
Project.  The  software  can  be  freely  obtained  from  a  central 
repository  and  modified  in  terms  of  the  license.  The  Android 
platform is based on the Linux kernel, which is modified to meet 
special needs of better power management, memory management 
and runtime environment. Also, as Android is designed to be used 
on Smartphones and tablets, it has many changes and updates to 
the  Linux  kernel  in order to  support different devices [2]. The 
additions  include  subsystem  to  control  memory  and  processor, 
libraries to manage file systems designed for memories, process 
management and device management. 
The  Android  software  stack  can  be  subdivided  into  five 
layers: the Linux Kernel and lower level tools, System Libraries, 
the  Android  Runtime,  the  Application  Framework  and 
Application  layer  on  top  of  all.  Each  layer  provides  different 
services to the layer just above it. 
2.1  LINUX KERNEL   
The Linux kernel is the basic layer equivalent to an abstract 
level  between  hardware  layer  and  other  software  layers  in  the 
system. The Android OS is built on top of this Linux kernel with 
some changes in the architecture made by Google [7]. The kernel 
contains a vast array of device drivers which makes interfacing to 
peripheral  hardware  easy.  The  kernel  provides  basic  system 
functionality  like  memory  management,  process  management, 
security, device management, network group etc. [7]. 
2.2  LIBRARIES 
On  top  of  the  Linux  kernel  is  a  set  of  Android’s  native 
C/C++  libraries.  The  libraries  are  specific  for  particular 
hardware.  For  example,  the  media  framework  library  guides 
playback  and  recording  of  various  pictures,  video  and  audio 
formats.  Some  other  important  core  libraries  include  Surface 
Manager, SQLite, WebKit and OpenGL. 
2.3  ANDROID RUNTIME 
Android  Runtime  includes  set  of  core  Java  libraries. 
Application  programmers  use  Java  programming  language  for 
developing  apps.  It  includes  the  Dalvik  Virtual  machine  and 
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Fig.1. Android Architecture 
 Dalvik Virtual Machine: A virtual machine runs as if it 
was  an  independent  device  having  its  own  operating 
system. It permits numerous instances of virtual machine to 
be  executed  simultaneously  providing  isolation,  security, 
memory  management  and  threading  support  [7].  Each 
application  runs  as  its  own  process  in  a  virtual  machine 
such that no other application is dependent on it and in case 
of  application  crash,  it  would  not  affect  any  other 
application  running  on  the  device  [2].  These  features 
together are called the sandbox. 
 Core Java Libraries: Most of the functionality defined in 
the  Java  SE  libraries,  including  tasks  such  as  string 
handling, networking and file manipulation is provided by 
these libraries. 
2.4  APPLICATION FRAMEWORK 
Application framework manages the functions of the phone 
such  as  resource  management,  voice  call  management,  etc. 
Applications from the upper layer interact with the Application 
Framework layer. Some of the important blocks of Application 
framework are Activity Manager, Content Provider, Telephony 
Manager, Location Manager and Resource Manager [7]. 
2.5  APPLICATIONS 
Application is the topmost layer of android architecture. An 
average user mostly interacts with this layer to perform basic 
functions like  making phone call, accessing  web browser etc. 
The Android SDK tools compile the application code and related 
data or resource file into an android package with .apk suffix [1]. 
All the contents of an .apk file comprise one application that can 
be installed on android device. The Android platform has some 
preinstalled  applications  by  default  for  the  browser,  dialer, 
home, connection manager, etc. Developers are free to use their 
innovation to build new application according to user’s need.  
 
3. ANDROID VULNERABILITIES 
We classified the vulnerabilities found in android according 
to various layers of the android architecture from  which  they 
originated.  The  categories  are:  Linux  Kernel  Layer,  Libraries 
Layer,  Application  Framework  Layer,  Applications  Layer  and 
External Drivers. The purpose of this classification is to identify 
the  weak  areas  of  android  implementation.  From  the  sample 
space of 30 exploits with CVSS scores ranging from 2.6 to 10, 
the Application Framework Layer was found to have the most 
number of exploits.  
3.1  APPLICATION FRAMEWORK LAYER 
The vulnerabilities in Application Framework Layer caused 
DoS,  privilege  escalation,  code  execution  and  unauthenticated 
access. For example, a recent vulnerability allows a malicious 
app to bypass intended access restrictions and remove the device 
locks activated by any user. Similarly, a Bluetooth service flaw 
compromised  the  user’s  contact  data  which  is  considered  as 
sensitive data. An old exploit allowed an app to bypass several 
permissions  and  allow  the  attacker  to  access  the  camera  and 
microphone  without  making  permission  requests.  Other 
vulnerabilities  found  are  CVE-2011-3975,  CVE-2011-0680, 
CVE-2011-4804,  CVE-2009-2999,  CVE-2009-2656  and  CVE-
2009-1754. 
3.2  APPLICATION LAYER 
The  Application  Layer  exploits  occurred  mostly  through 
browsers which allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code and 
provide unauthenticated access to some protected resources. It 
also includes the vulnerability of the Picasa app where username 
and  passwords  were  sent  in  clear  text  when  transmitting  the 
authToken obtained after ClientLogin [8]. As a result, personal 
pictures and gallery could be accessed by anyone who sniffs the 
authToken. This famous exploit had the highest CVSS score of 
10 as it completely compromised the CIA parameters. A bug in 
the  Android  browser  allowed  man  in  the  middle  attack  and 
monitoring of user activities on the browser. It could not restrict 
modifications to HTTPS session cookies allowing user to inject 
arbitrary  cookies  for  the  sessions.  Application  layer  includes 
vulnerabilities  like  CVE-2012-6301,  CVE-2012-3979,  CVE-
2011-2357, CVE-2011-2344 and CVE-2008-7298. 
3.3  EXTERNAL DRIVERS 
The  flaws  in  the  implementation  of  external  drivers  like 
Qualcomm and PowerVR have also caused vulnerabilities. Some 
specially  crafted  arguments  for  a  local  kgcl_ioctl  call  caused 
DoS  in  Qualcomm  graphics  kernel  driver  which  can  further 
execute arbitrary code for the attacker in the kernel context. In 
this, using an application, an attacker could dereference several 
untrusted  pointers  from  the  user  space  and  perform  further 
computations without verification. The Levitator exploit targeted 
the  PowerVR  graphics  card  driver  which  led  to  privilege 
escalation  through  kernel  memory  corruption  caused  in 
/dev/pvrsrvkm  device  [22].  Some  other  vulnerabilities  in  this 
category  are  CVE-2013-3666,  CVE-2012-4222,  CVE-2012-
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Fig.2. Total vulnerabilities at each layer 
3.4  LIBRARIES LAYER 
The vulnerabilities in Libraries layer with very high CVSS 
scores had a huge impact. For example, the ZergRush exploit 
found  in  2011  performed  DOS  and  its  exploit  code  is  also 
available  at  [18].  ZergRush  exploit  performed  stack  buffer 
overflow,  and  followed  by  code  execution,  by  passing  wrong 
number  of  arguments  to  a  particular  API.  The  GingerBreak 
exploit  CVE-2011-1823  was  even  used  by  some  well-known 
malwares to get the root of devices. It took advantage of the fact 
that  the  vold  volume  manager  daemon  trusted  messages  that 
were received from a PF_NETLINK socket, which allowed gain 
root  privileges  by  bypassing  a  signed  integer  check  with 
negative index [11].  The most recent CVE-2013-4787 allowed 
any person to modify a developer-signed APK file and upload 
malicious  content  in  it  without  modifying  the  signature.  This 
vulnerability,  famously  known  as  the  “Master  Key” 
vulnerability, can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on 
the victim machine. Other vulnerabilities falling in this category 
are CVE-2011-0419, CVE-2010-1807 and CVE-2009-3698. 
3.5  LINUX KERNEL LAYER 
As  we  know  that  the  Android  kernel  is  derived  from  the 
Linux kernel itself, choosing the most secure kernel has always 
been neglected. The wrong permission sets owned by the zygote 
socket  allowed  any  application  to  send  any  number  of  fork 
requests without verifying its identity. It resulted in DOS in fork 
requests  from  legitimate  processes.  The  KillingInTheNameOf 
exploit  by  Sebastian  Krahmer  of  743C  team  targeted 
vulnerability in ashmem that allowed any user to remap shared 
memory  region  belonging  to  init  with  PROT_READ  and 
PROT_WRITE  permissions  [11].  This  vulnerability  was  also 
demonstrated by the psneuter exploit. 
 
 
 
4. ANDROID  SECURITY  USING  EXPLOIT 
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
The  main  target  for  implementing  Android  security  is  to 
protect  the  user  data,  system  resources,  and  providing 
application isolation. For this, Android has timely  updated its 
security  controls  with  each  patch  and  every  version  it  has 
released. The earlier versions of Android had very little or no 
security features to protect against advanced attacks because the 
development was still on and also very few people had android 
devices.  
4.1  ANDROID CUPCAKE 
Android  1.5  CupCake  had  propolice  and  safe_iop  as  two 
security features against buffer overflows [9]. ProPolice prevents 
stack buffer overruns and safe_iop stops integer overflows. But 
the two were ineffective as ASLR was still not present.   
4.2  ANDROID GINGERBREAD 
In  Android  2.3  Gingerbread,  hardware  based  No  eXecute 
(NX)  was  enforced.  So  even  if  some  application  is  able  to 
perform buffer overflow and put the exploit code on the stack or 
heap, the exploit would not execute because of this protection. It 
also  added  the  format  string  vulnerability  protection  as  users 
were able to input specially crafted strings which the application 
evaluated as a command allowing code execution, reading the 
stack  or  cause  segmentation  faults  in  the  running  application. 
Apart from this, mmap_min_addr is introduced at a basic level 
to  check  NULL  pointer  dereference  bugs  in  kernel  space.  It 
protects the system against crashes caused due to triggering of 
one of such NULL pointer defects. 
4.3  ANDROID ICE CREAM SANDWICH 
Android 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich became the first version to 
implement  ASLR.  Address  Space  Layout  Randomization 
(ASLR) randomizes memory addresses of stack, heap, etc each 
time the memory allocation is done for a process/module. But 
the  first  implementation  did  not  live  up  to  the  expectations 
because of lack of randomization of the executable and linker 
memory  regions.  Hence  attacks  using  Return  Oriented 
Programming (ROP) were still possible.  
4.4  ANDROID JELLY BEANS 
With  the  enforcement  of  a  few  more  exploit  mitigation 
techniques  in  Jelly  Beans  4.1,  the  hard  work  of  vulnerability 
hunters even got harder. The Position Independent Executables 
support technique allows binaries to be compiled/linked with the 
PIE flag to ensure the executable mapping will be randomized 
when executed. Also, kernel.randomize_va_space is being set to 
2 to enable heap randomization. In the same way, lib/mmap and 
linker  are  also  randomized.  The  GingerBreak  exploit  as 
mentioned earlier used a Global Offset Table (GOT) overwrite 
to perform code execution in vold daemon. To put a check on 
the  exploit,  ELF  hardening  is  done  where  each  binary  is 
compiled with the RELRO and BIND_NOW flags. Relocation 
Read-Only (RELRO) flag tells the linker to make the relocation 
segments that are used to resolve dynamically loaded functions 
read-only [8]. With BIND_NOW flag, programs can resolve all 
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dynamic links at start-up itself so that the GOT can be made read 
only when combined with RELRO. 
Jelly  Beans  also  added  dmesg_restrict  and  kptr_restrict 
protections to avoid leaking of kernel addresses. Dmesg_restrict 
protection  [22]  restricts  unprivileged  access  to  kernel  syslog 
which prevents leaking of  kernel information into  user space. 
Kptr_restrict  protection  [23]  restricts  exposing  some  kernel 
pointers through various interfaces in /proc. 
The  next  version  4.2  of  Jelly  Beans  brought  some  more 
security  enhancements.  Installd  daemon  hardening  is  done  to 
reduce potential attack surface through root privilege escalation. 
All  system  libraries  and  applications  during  compile  time  are 
checked with FORTIFY_SOURCE that detects and prevents a 
subset of buffer overflows before they could do  any damage. 
Further,  init  script  hardening  is  also  introduced  by  applying 
O_NOFOLLOW semantics to prevent symlink related attacks.  
Apart  from  the  above  mentioned  memory  protection 
schemes,  vulnerability  fixes  in  the  open  source  libraries  like 
WebKit, libpng, OpenSSL and LibXML are also included. Users 
can also verify the apps before installing them to check if it is 
malicious or not.  
The most significant security update came in Jelly Beans 4.3 
when SELinux was reinforced for Android Sandbox. SELinux 
[15] implements Mandatory Access Control (MAC) in the Linux 
Kernel  which  added  more  robustness  to  the  present  security 
model, but taking care that it is still compatible with existing 
applications. Setuid and setguid features were removed so that 
no  low  privileged  user  can  execute  a  file/module  with  high 
privileges. Had this been implemented in the earlier versions of 
Android,  exploits  like  RageAgainstTheCage  and  ZimperLich 
would not have occurred. 
4.5  ANDROID KITKAT 
At present, the latest Android 4.4 KitKat is launched with 
significant enhancements to the existing security enforcements. 
KitKat runs SELinux in enforcing mode restricting activities of 
all  modules  and  applications  in  accordance  withSELinux 
policies.  The  AndroidKeyStore  is  upgraded  to  include  the 
advanced  ECDSA  and  DSA  algorithms  [9].  KitKat  has  also 
introduced  an  experimental  security  feature,  dm-verity,  to 
protect against advanced malware/rootkits which stay persistent 
in a system. It is basically a kernel level protection which can 
detect  modifications  on  the  file  system  by  maintaining  a 
cryptographic tree.  
The  impact  of  these  mitigation  techniques  is  huge  and 
statistics proves this as well. There were 13 listed vulnerabilities 
in 2011 when the latest version was GingerBread 2.3. After Ice 
Cream Sandwich was released, not more than 5 vulnerabilities 
with  high  CVSS  scores  have  been  reported  each  year.  ASLR 
protection feature in ICS 4.0 has significantly improved the level 
of security in Android. This mainly strengthened the Application 
Framework  Layer  as  the  vulnerabilities  originating  from  this 
layer have reduced to almost nil and it has become very difficult 
to perform buffer overflows, DoS attacks and code execution. 
The library layer API security level has increased because of 
security features like ELF hardening, FORTIFY_SOURCE and 
installd hardening. Only a few vulnerabilities originating from 
libraries layer have been discovered after the launch of ICS. 
With the implementation of SELinux in Android, MAC was 
enforced as a security mechanism instead of DAC. It indeed was 
a  difficult  challenge  to  implement  SELinux  because  of  the 
discretionary  nature  of  the  Android  APIs.  The  system-wide 
policies implemented through the MAC are able to put a check 
on many exploits like GingerBreak, Exploid, RageAgainstTheCage, 
Zimperlich,  KillingInTheNameOf,  Levitator,  and  Psneuter  [15]. 
SELinux  has  put  a  check  on  the  privilege  escalation 
vulnerabilities,  as  it  only  gives  the  permissions  which  are 
mandatory and avoid giving discretionary powers at runtime. 
5. ANDROID MALWARES OVERVIEW 
Android Malwares have been a major security concern for all 
the users of the OS. Malwares can hide in the phone memory 
without the user’s knowledge and spy on all his browser and 
system  activities.  Some  malwares  even  sent  premium  SMS 
messages  without  user permission to communicate  with  C&C 
server. Malware infected APK files were initially distributed by 
third-party Chinese Android app market, but Android.DroidDream 
was  the  first  malware  to  be  distributed  through  the  official 
Android  Market.  Users  must  make  sure  to  check  what 
permissions the app  wants before installing it,  for example, a 
system cleaner tool won’t require permissions for GPS service. 
Other types of malwares use exploits like RageAgainstTheCage 
and  KillingInTheNameOf  to  perform  privileged  actions  [20]. 
More advanced malwares like DroidKungFu, Geinimi, NickiBot 
and FakePlayer have compromised user privacy.  
6. CONCLUSION 
After studying in detail the various Android vulnerabilities, 
it’s clear how dangerous its impact can be. To tackle the number 
of increasing vulnerabilities, Android must timely introduce new 
security  enforcement  and  exploit  mitigation  techniques.  The 
kernel of Linux OS itself is so vulnerable that every week new 
exploit is discovered. The vulnerability fixes released for these 
should be patched in Android's Linux Kernel as well to avoid 
replicating  the  same  vulnerabilities  again.  To  stay  away  from 
malwares,  users  need  to  be  aware  about  the  importance  of 
looking  over  the  permissions  granted  to  an  app  during 
installation time and to download apps from the official Google 
play store. In the coming years, we see Android to be a very 
secure OS, which the users can trust enough to do even their 
banking transactions from smart phones. 
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